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This article presents a model of decision making and introduces a new theoretical variable to the
literature, namely, the modes of decision making. The theoretical focus is on the face-to-face group,
and the article also develops an innovative methodology for studying this type of decision-making
behavior. Variation in the decision modes is explained as a function of the strategic considerations of
individual decision makers. These considerations are affected by a set of four independent variables:
structure of the decision group, substance of the conflict, context of the conflict, and the decision pro-
cess. The data, drawn from observations of decision-making groups in Switzerland, are tested with
discriminant analysis and a simulation. In both cases total correct classifications exceed 55 percent, in-
dicating that there is a meaningful structure relating variation in the decision modes to the theoretical
framework.
How the political scientist should study deci-
sion-making behavior remains a perplexing and
unresolved issue. The discipline has witnessed the
rise (and fall?) of numerous competing ap-
proaches, ranging from the exclusively macro-
level systems approach and its now much-
maligned "black box" to the spate of economic
models focusing on the individual, rational deci-
sion maker acting largely in isolation. Until fairly
recently, political scientists have appeared some-
what wary of studying decision making at a level
of analysis that falls somewhere in between these
macro- and micro-analytic approaches, namely,
at the level of the "face-to-face" group. In other
disciplines, notably social psychology, a great deal
of research on face-to-face groups has been con-
ducted. Kirkpatrick (1976) points out the utility to
political scientists of such a theoretical focus in a
special issue of the American Behavioral Scientist
which focuses on small group theory, while
Golembiewski (1970) contains a collection of es-
says on precisely this topic. Other examples of
useful research in this area include Fiorina and
Plott (1978), Hinckley (1979), Sullivan (1976),
and Verba (1961).
The purpose of this article is to explore the pos-
sibility of developing a general theory of political
decision making in face-to-face groups. In an ear-
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lier study (1980b), our theoretical concern was fo-
cused largely at the macro-level of whole political
systems: we attempted to demonstrate that what
was understood conceptually as "consociational
democracy" was in reality a much more complex
set of decision-making norms and behavior than
heretofore assumed by the theory. In the present
context we want to demonstrate the extent to
which our theoretical framework can contribute
to a broader understanding of a general class of
political decision-making behavior in committees.
Data: Background and Description
Our data are drawn from observations of the
Free Democratic party of the Berne Canton in
Switzerland. The basic research method was par-
ticipant observation. As is so often the case with
research of this nature, access to the decision-
making groups was largely the fortuitous result of
the social scientist happening to be in the right
place at the right time. As a member of the FDP,
Jilrg Steiner was able to secure the much-needed
access not only to all the relevant committee meet-
ings, but also to interview data, recorded minutes
of meetings, and to other internal and external
flows of communication in the party. During the
21 months in which he carried out his observa-
tions (January 1969-September 1970), Steiner ob-
served the decision-making behavior in 111 com-
mittee meetings. These meetings ranged in size
from the very large party conventions (N = 150) to
the very small bureau of the executive committee
(four members). Consequently, we are not dealing
solely with small face-to-face decision-making
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groups, but with large, even cumbersome ones as
well.
Our units of analysis are individual, openly ar-
ticulated conflicts in the groups. At least two par-
ticipants had to express explicit disagreement on a
particular point before the disagreement could
qualify as a conflict. If a conflict reappeared in a
later meeting of the same committee, it was
treated as a second case because under these new
circumstances the actual decision-making process
might very well differ from that of the first meet-
ing. In all, we obtained data on 466 such conflicts.
Dependent Variable:
Modes of Decision Making
One of the central problems confronting studies
of face-to-face decision-making groups is the se-
lection of an appropriate dependent variable.
Most studies focus on the decision outcome itself,
attempting to explain the group decision as a
function of individual preference orderings. Pre-
dicting such outcomes generally requires that the
researcher have a fairly extensive knowledge of in-
dividual preferences prior to and during the deci-
sion process. In real-world settings it is often ex-
tremely difficult, if not impossible, to obtain such
information; recurrent interviewing of partici-
pants can seriously disrupt the normal course of
political business in any decision-making group.
In this study we will introduce a dependent
variable that has received relatively little syste-
matic attention in the professional literature,
namely, the modes of decision making. Rather
than focusing our attention on the substantive
outcome of a decision, we will look instead at the
decision mechanism by which that outcome was
achieved. The assumption is that the decision out-
come will often be strongly, influenced by the de-
cision mode. Thus the innovativeness of group
decisions may depend on the mechanisms by
which groups arrive at their decisions. In addi-
tion, the decision modes may have implications
for a wide range of variables that are important
from the perspective of normative democratic
theory, such as the willingness of group members
to participate in further meetings and the level of
hostility and antagonism in such groups.
Typology
We have developed our typology of decision
modes along three dimensions: (1) Whether or not
the substance of the conflict was resolved, (2) the
degree of formalization of the decision, and (3)
the persistence of dissent within the group. When
a conflict arises and disagreement is openly articu-
lated, the first question one needs to ask is
whether or not the substance of that conflict is re-
solved in that particular meeting. Although "de-
ciding not to decide" is obviously a decision of
sorts, it is limited to the procedural matter of leav-
ing the conflict unresolved. Since the substance of
the conflict remains unresolved, the possibility
exists that it will be brought up again later; it is
also possible that postponement is tantamount to
"killing" a proposal, much as occurs at times in
the U.S. Congress when a bill is referred back to a
committee. Regardless of the specific reasons for
postponement or the eventual outcome of a subse-
quent conflict concerning the issue, we consider
these unresolved conflicts as no decisions. Ob-
viously, this term has a much narrower definition
than the term nondecision originally used by Peter
Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz (1962).
If the substance of a conflict is resolved by the
group, it may be accomplished in a formalized or
informalized manner. The possible advantages of
an informal decision mechanism include the fact
that it reduces the clear distinction between win-
ners and losers, which can at times help to pre-
serve harmonious intragroup relations, and it al-
lows for subtle manipulation of the decision-
making process. An informal decision occurs
when one (or more) of the participants simply in-
terprets what he/she considers to be the essence of
the discussion, and then succeeds in obtaining the
tacit support of the other participants for this in-
terpretation. We have labeled this mode of deci-
sion making decision by interpretation and we can
distinguish three ways in which such interpreta-
tions are made: (1) by the committee chairperson
in a final summary, (2) by the secretary in the min-
utes, and (3) by individuals in the decision-making
process who tacitly interpret the preference of the
group and then direct the discussion in such a way
that a decision is implicitly made. One of the cen-
tral characteristics of a decision by interpretation
is that, while it does resolve the substance of a
conflict, it does not give any clear indication of
whether the disagreement in the group persists or
vanishes in the course of discussion. This decision
mode also provides substantial leeway for those
group leaders who are adept manipulators of the
decision-making process.
A formal decision mode is one in which the par-
ticipants who have expressed an opinion in the
course of a discussion are required to take a visi-
ble stand on the issue when a decision is made. If
dissent among group members persists, we will
have a majority decision: a vote will be taken that
will distinguish a winning side from a losing side.
The criteria for winning may be a simple plurality,
an absolute majority or a qualified majority such
as two-thirds of the votes. If, however, the dis-
agreement disappears at the end of the discussion,
the resulting decision will be achieved through
amicable agreement. Such an agreement may be
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Table 1. Typology of Decision Modes About Manifest Conflicts in Face-to-Face Groups
Persistence
of Dissent
Disappearance
of Dissent
Resolved Conflict
Formalized
Decision
Majority
Decision
Amicable
Agreement
No Formalized
Decision
Decision by
Interpretation
Unresolved Conflict
No Decision
Source: Compiled by the authors.
given through an oral statement or a gesture such
as a nodding of the head. The agreement may also
be expressed through a unanimous vote. Obvious-
ly, amicable agreement means only that the mani-
fest disagreement has disappeared; whether or not
latent conflicts persist among the group members
is not considered.
Of these four modes of decision making, three
should be quite familiar from everyday usage and
various treatments in the professional literature.
Of course, different labels have been applied to
the mechanisms but majority rule, no decision,
and amicable agreement are not fundamentally
new concepts. Decision by interpretation, how-
ever, is a concept that we developed while work-
ing within this theoretical context. As we have
shown elsewhere (1980a), we feel that such deci-
sions occur frequently in a variety of contexts.
Theoretical Framework
Having sketched the important characteristics
of the four modes of decision making, we move
now to a consideration of our theoretical frame-
work. Obviously, our task is to explain under
what conditions specific decision modes will be
employed in face-to-face decision-making groups.
Before we can select the independent variables
that we will use in explaining this dependent be-
havior, however, we must specify the theoretical
framework from which we will subsequently de-
rive our explanatory variables. We begin with a
set of axiomatic assumptions concerning the gen-
eral behavior of politicians in face-to-face groups
and build our theoretical framework deductively,
ultimately arriving at a point from which we can
select a set of relevant independent variables and a
number of hypotheses relating these variables to
variation in the modes of decision making.
In general, we assume that politicians are indi-
vidual value-maximizers. Moreover, given a set of
preferences or a rank-ordering of values, these in-
dividuals will seek to maximize those values that
they consider to be in their best interests. In this
basic sense we share the microanalytic, rational-
actor focus of most economic decision-making
models. However, our theoretical approach de-
parts significantly from these economic models in
our conceptualization of the range of values that
politicians maximize and the degree to which these
values are assumed to remain constant over time
and across issues. Specifically, we assume that the
range of values can be accurately identified and
subsumed under four general headings: power,
group solidarity, rectitude, and time. In addition,
we assume that the individual weights assigned to
these values will vary from actor to actor and, for
each actor, from situation to situation.1 This as-
sumption introduces a dynamic component to our
theory since we assume that no single value will
always be the primary goal for every politician in
every decision-making situation. The research
task is then to specify under what conditions cer-
tain values are likely to be more important than
others, and hence how that particular value struc-
'The validity of this assumption is supported in the
works of Lehner and Schiitte (1976) and MacCrimmon
and Messick (1976), for example.
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ture is likely to affect the selection of a decision
mode.2
We have also assumed that the selection of a de-
cision mode by a face-to-face decision-making
group depends to a significant degree on the
values that the members of the group try to maxi-
mize. So, for example, one might think of an indi-
vidual politician who would like to see a most pre-
ferred outcome reflected in the group decision. If
this politician is concerned only with winning a
particular conflict (maximizing power), and if
he/she believes the necessary majority support ex-
ists, he/she might press for a vote. If, on the other
hand, one fears that such a vote might lead to di-
visive intra-group strife, one might try to "inter-
pret" the decision; this would allow one to
achieve the objective of "winning" the conflict
while at the same time facilitating the preservation
of group solidarity by partially concealing the
identities of those members who are in the losing
minority. A decision maker who feels that the
necessary support for a preferred outcome is lack-
ing might pursue a strategy of no decision in the
hope that postponement would provide sufficient
time to muster that additional support. If the indi-
vidual preferences are relatively weak and con-
cerns with group solidarity are strong, it seems
likely that amicable agreement will be the desired
strategy. If participants are tired and/or frus-
trated after a lengthy decision process, calling for
a quick vote may be desirable if the primary goal
has become finishing the business at hand rather
than finding an optimal decision outcome. In
other words, the selection of a particular decision
mode is assumed to be the aggregate result of the
strategic considerations of individual participants
in the group decision-making process. These stra-
tegic considerations, moreover, will reflect the in-
terplay of the four values included in our model.
Of course, we anticipate that most decision-
making situations will be characterized not by the
dominance of a single value but by an interplay of
the four. In many cases different participants will
be motivated by different values in the same deci-
sion situation. Consequently, even our relatively
short list of four values presents us with a poten-
tially staggering number of logically possible com-
binations. When we add the further theoretical
consideration that the rank-ordering of the four
values can change for each individual within each
decision situation, it becomes apparent that for-
mulating hypotheses for all of the logically possi-
ble combinations would be a nearly endless and
perhaps fruitless endeavor. Rather than pursuing
this particular avenue in the development of our
lA description and analysis of these values may be
found in Dorff (1978).
theory, we try instead to decide on the basis of our
independent variables which values are likely to be
most important for the largest number of partici-
pants (with some additional consideration of
weighting for the more powerful group members).
From this information we then make probabilistic
estimates of the likelihoods of occurrence for the
four modes of decision making. Although we will
therefore be unable to test empirically each of the
posited relationships between the values and the
decision modes at the micro-level, we will be able
to determine whether our more aggregate predic-
tions based on these microanalytic linkages corre-
spond to the observed outcomes. In the end, the
fit between our model's predictions and the ob-
served outcomes should provide some measure of
the overall plausibility of the micro-level theoreti-
cal reasoning that led to the predictions. The next
question, then, is: what variables influence the
values that political decision makers maximize
and hence, the modes of decision making that a
face-to-face group employs?
Independent Variables and Hypotheses
Previous research and our knowledge of the rel-
evant literature have helped us arrive at four sets
of potential explanatory variables. These sets are
organized under the following headings:
1. Structure of the decision group
2. Substance of the conflict
3. Context of the conflict
4. Decision process
It seems wholly plausible that the values that an
individual decision maker chooses to maximize
will depend on the attributes of the group within
which the decision process takes place. Equally
plausible is the notion that these values will be af-
fected by the kind of conflict being debated. We
also expect the broader context within which a
conflict takes place to have an impact on these
values. Finally, since we have stressed that we ex-
pect these values to change under certain condi-
tions once the discussion unfolds, we assume that
these values will be affected by the structure of the
decision process.
A wide range of variables was employed for the
four sets (see Table 2). For each of the variables
we formulated a detailed hypothesis relating
change in the variable to changes in the values and
ultimately to changes in the modes of decision
making. Each of these hypotheses was formulated
prior to the completion of any data analysis;
hence the nature of the hypothesized predictions
is entirely a priori. Rather than presenting each of
the independent variables and the related hy-
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potheses, we shall illustrate our general procedure
by way of a single example.
For our example we have chosen the variable,
"size of the group." First, we concentrate on the
way in which the four values may be influenced by
the size of the decision group. Perhaps the most
obvious impact can be seen for the opportunity
costs of lost time. In a large group there are more
potential speakers, which raises the prospect of a
lengthy discussion. At the same time the typical
group member has relatively few opportunities to
intervene in the discussion, and much time will be
spent simply listening to other members. This
mostly passive role, particularly when extended
over a lengthy meeting, may contribute increas-
ingly to the feeling that time could be better in-
vested for other purposes. Thus the incentive
grows to reduce the opportunity costs represented
by this loss of valuable time. In a small group, on
the other hand, the discussion tends to be shorter
and everyone can participate more fully. Conse-
quently, the decision makers generally do not per-
ceive the time spent in the decision process as a
significant opportunity cost.
In addition to its effect on considerations of
time, the size of a group probably influences the
importance of group solidarity as an incentive as
well. Solidarity is expected to be more important
in small groups because the low number of partici-
pants will lead to a high number of interpersonal
interactions and, according to George Homans'
well-known hypothesis, frequent interactions
should be a favorable condition for solidarity
(Homans, 1961). Another argument, based on Ol-
son's work, states that in a small group each actor
can contribute in a more perceptible way to main-
taining the group, whereas maintaining a large
group depends much less clearly on the actions
and inactions of individual group members (1965,
p. 65). Thus in a small group the motivation of a
rational actor to work for group solidarity should
be much greater than in a large group.
We anticipate that considerations of power will
have a greater impact in large groups than in small
groups. In part, this is due to the effect of con-
siderations of solidarity as noted in the preceding
paragraph. In addition, the larger the number of
people attending a meeting, the more that meeting
takes on the character of a spectacle; the more the
participants feel as though they are "performing"
in this spectacle, the more power considerations
will be involved. Winning or losing has a much
more dramatic effect in a large group than in a
small group, and scoring a point in the closeness
and informality of a small group is much less
spectacular than scoring the same point in the
limelight of a large meeting.
We can find no logical reasons why the size of
the group would have an influence on considera-
tions of rectitude.
The causal linkage between the size of the
group, the values, and the modes of decision mak-
ing can now be made. The pressure for solidarity
in a small group can be best met with a decision by
Table 2. Independent Variables
Structure of Decision Group
1. Size
2. Predominance of low-status participants
3. Frequency of interactions among the members
-Frequency of meetings
-Number of governmental functions of the
members
4. Age of the members
-Biological age
-Political age
5. Homogeneity
-By language
-By sex
-By religion
-By education
—By occupation
-By rural background
—By place of residence*
Substance of Conflict
6. Valence nature
7. Reference group
8. Innovativeness
9. Personnel versus policy conflict
10. Perceived importance of conflict
-Participation rate at the meeting
-Length of the discussion
Context of Conflict
11. Time distance to parliamentary elections
12. Unlikelihood of referendum
13. Pre-parliamentary versus parliamentary stage
14. Party control of government
Decision Process
15. Formality of discussion
16. Focus of discussion
-Number of agenda points in meeting
-Number of issues within the agenda point
under discussion
-Number of decisions in meeting
17. Timing of the discussion
18. Certainty of information
19. Number of proposals
20. Origin of proposals
21. Structure of debate
—Distribution of opinions
—Number of speakers with clearly expressed
opinion
Source: Compiled by the authors.
*The directional sign for this variable is reversed
from the other homogeneity variables. In this case a
high positive value indicates a heterogeneous group; a
high negative value indicates a homogeneous group.
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amicable agreement. Two potential obstacles to
this decision mode are not particularly salient in
small groups, namely, time pressure and consider-
ations of power. If amicable agreement cannot be
achieved in a small group, the second best choice
seems to be no decision or decision by interpreta-
tion, both of which would not disrupt solidarity
significantly. A majority decision appears to be
the least desirable choice since it may be detri-
mental to solidarity. In large groups, an impor-
tant consideration is the time factor which can be
best served with a majority decision. A majority
decision also contributes to the concerns with
power since it allows each participant to stand
visibly by an original position. Of course, stand-
ing by one's position can result in a loss of power
if that position winds up in the minority. How-
ever, since group solidarity is relatively unimpor-
tant in large groups, the majority will be largely
unconcerned with what happens to the minority,
so concessions will be unlikely. Amicable agree-
ment should be quite infrequent in large groups
since achieving such agreement is both time-
consuming and premised on the salience of group
solidarity.
After formulating all of our hypotheses in this
manner, we proceeded to the empirical analyses.
Statistical Methods of Analysis
As a response to the categorical nature of our
dependent variable, we first employed discrimi-
nant analysis. The technical nature and theoretical
underpinnings of this technique have been dis-
cussed elsewhere (Dorff, 1978). For the moment
we shall point out that this technique is designed
to find a particular linear combination of inde-
pendent variables that will maximally discriminate
between two or more groups of observations.3
That combination (or combinations) is then used
to classify the individual observations in one of
the categories of the dependent variable. The
more clearly the categories are distinguished by
thep-dimensional vector(s) comprised of the p in-
dependent variables, the more successful or accu-
rate will be the classification procedure. The vec-
tors provide some indication of the relative
strengths (contributions) of the independent vari-
ables in distinguishing among the categories,
while the classification scheme indicates the extent
to which the combination(s) accurately differen-
tiate^) among the groups. It is in this very general
sense that comparisons are often drawn between
Technically, this amounts lo solving the basic char-
acteristic equation problem:
{W~lB - \l)d = 0 when W * 0.
the vector of b's and the R1 in regression analysis
and the discriminant functions and the successful
classification rate in discriminant analysis.
A second, major component of our analysis
was a simulation in which we attempted to classify
each conflict according to the decision mode most
likely to be employed under the conditions speci-
fied by the independent variables. Rather than re-
ducing the scope and precision of our predictions
by choosing more than one possible outcome, we
have made single-point predictions; in other
words, if two decision modes are considered likely
to occur but one seems more likely than the other,
we have chosen the most likely decision mode as
our single prediction. It should be clear, however,
that this single prediction does not reflect the fact
that our theory postulates a non-zero probability
for the occurrence of other decision modes (al-
though not in all cases). Making this single pre-
diction will mean that our overall success rate wil
be considerably lower than if we made more than
one prediction.
Empirical Tests
Discriminant Analysis. In Tables 3 and 4 we have
reproduced the results of the discriminant analy-
sis. Three components of these results deserve
special treatment: (1) the discriminant functions
and the variable loadings, (2) the location of the
group centroids in the reduced space, and (3) the
classification table.
1. Discriminant Functions. Discriminant func-
tions are similar to factors in a factor analysis in
that the loadings of the individual variables on the
function provide some indication of the relative
contribution that an independent variable makes
to the discrimination among the groups; simply
stated, higher loadings on the discriminant func-
tion imply greater significance of those variables.
The ten variables contained in Table 3 are drawn
from a pool of 21 independent variables originally
employed in the discriminant analysis (see Table
2).4
2. Centroids of Groups in Reduced Space.
These figures indicate the locations of the four
group means in the reduced three-dimensional
space defined by the three discriminant functions.
This reduced list of independent variables was de-
rived from the original 21 variables through the use of a
preliminary set of bivariate analyses. The criteria for
selection or exclusion included both the apparent
strength of the relationship and the degree to which the
nature of the relationship corresponded to our original
hypotheses. For a detailed discussion of each of these
variables and the bivariate analyses, see Dorff (1978),
Chs. 5-8.
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Table 3. Discriminant Analysis Results
Variable
Structure of Decision Group
1. Size
2. Predominance of low-status participants
3. Frequency of interactions among members
-Frequency of meetings
—Number of governmental functions of the members
4. Homogeneity
-By rural background
-By place of residence**
Standardized Discriminant
Function Coefficients
Function 1
.08
- .55*
.02
-.66*
-.09
-.40*
Function 2
.09
.40*
-.39*
.54*
-.11
.07
Function 3
-.48*
.48*
-.13
.49*
.42*
.11
Substance of Conflict
5. Valence nature of conflict
Context of Conflict
6. Time distance to parliamentary elections
7. Unlikelihood of referendum
Decision Process
8. Formality of discussion
9. Focus of discussion
.58*
-.10
-.05
.26
.03
- .32
.34*
-.49*
.19
.53*
-.46*
-.18
-Number of agenda points in meeting
10. Number of proposals
Majority Decision (MD)
Amicable Agreement (AA)
No Decision (ND)
Decision by Interpretation (DI)
.20
.09
-.24
-.19
.43*
-.36*
Centroids of Groups in Reduced Space
Function 1
-.33
.54
-.63
.29
Function 2
-1.31
- .04
.28
.18
Function 3
-.12
.60
.14
-.41
Source: Developed by the authors from data in Robert H. Dorff, "Employing Simulation Analysis in
Decision-Making Theory," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1978.
•Important variables are at least half as large as the absolute value of the largest coefficient.
**The directional sign for this variable is reversed from the other homogeneity variables. In this case a high
positive value indicates a heterogeneous group; a high negative value indicates a homogeneous group.
The greater the relative distance between the
means, the more the groups are differentiated
along that dimension. When we combine the
directional sign (+ or —) for the group mean with
the directional sign for the independent variables
on the discriminant function, we have an indica-
tion not only of the strength or contribution of
the variables but also of the direction of the im-
pact on the likelihood of each of the four decision
modes. In order to assess this impact, we must
examine the three functions in order to determine
which groups are being most clearly discrimi-
nated.
A glance at the centroids for function 1 reveals
that it discriminates most clearly between ND
(—.63) and AA (.54), with a secondary discrimi-
nation between MD (—.33) and DI (.29). Table 3
reveals further that an increase in the predomi-
nance of low-status actors pushes the discriminant
function in a negative direction. Consequently, as
more low-status participants are involved, the
function takes on an increasingly negative value
and ND and MD become much more likely to oc-
cur while AA and DI become less likely. In the in-
itial formulation of our hypotheses we had antici-
pated just such a result: low-status participants,
being less concerned with group solidarity (AA)
and too inexperienced to be able to manipulate
the decision-making process (DI), are likely to
vote often and to postpone decisions. When we
look at the discriminant function as a whole and
try to characterize it according to the major vari-
ables contributing to it, we find that the function
takes on its highest positive value (thus favoring
AA and DI) under the following conditions: (1)
group structure characterized by a predominance
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of high-status actors who have shared a place of
residence (Berne) and who have not accumulated
numerous governmental functions, and (2) the
substance of the conflict characterized as a
valence issue. The finding concerning the number
of governmental functions runs counter to our ex-
pectations. We hypothesized that as the number
of these functions increased, the likelihood of in-
teraction among group members outside of this
group's meetings would increase. In so doing, this
would lead to greater concerns with solidarity.
The other findings are in accordance with our ex-
pectations.
The second discriminant function distinguishes
almost exclusively between MD (—1.31) and the
three other modes of decision making. In this case
five variables make the most significant contribu-
tion to the discriminant function. The relative ex-
planatory power of the second and third functions
is less than the first since, much as in a factor
analysis, they pick up only that information not
contained in the first function. When we look
once again at the entire function and attempt to
characterize it according to the five variables, we
find that the function takes on its highest negative
value (i.e., favoring MD) when: (1) group struc-
ture is characterized by frequent meetings, a pre-
dominance of high status actors, and a low group
average for governmental functions, (2) the con-
text is one in which a referendum is certain, and
(3) the decision process is formal. Under these
conditions, after having "controlled" for the in-
formation contained in the first discriminant
function, the results indicate that MD would be
the most likely outcome.
The primary contribution of the third discrimi-
nant function is the discrimination between AA
(.60) and DI (—.41), a feature that completes the
discrimination process by distinguishing between
the two decision modes that previously remained
relatively close together in the multidimensional
space defined by the independent variables. The
fact that eight variables make significant con-
tributions to this function is a further indication
of the decreasing importance of the functions; in
other words, the function is expectedly more dif-
fuse. Nevertheless, we can still attempt to charac-
terize this function generally according to these
variables. Such an attempt reveals that the func-
tion would take on its highest positive value when
the following conditions exist: (1) group structure
characterized as a small group, dominated by low
status actors, primarily homogeneous with regard
to rural residence, and with a high average num-
ber of governmental functions, (2) a context con-
sisting of impending or recently held elections and
a high possibility of a referendum on the issue,
and (3) a decision process that is relatively un-
focused (many agenda points) with only a few
proposals on the isue. In such situations it is like-
ly that AA would be employed and unlikely that
DI would result. With the notable exception ofthe
status variable, these results bear a close corre-
spondence to the hypotheses that we formulated
prior to the analysis.
3. Classification Table. This is the most impor-
tant component of the discriminant analysis. In
Table 4 we have reproduced the results of the clas-
sification procedure based on the preceding dis-
criminant functions. For each observed decision
an overall score on each of the discriminant func-
tions is calculated. The three scores for each
observation are then compared in order to predict
the value of the dependent variable on the basis of
the observed values of the independent variables.
The classification table then indicates both the
predicted and actual outcome for the observa-
tions, as well as an overall measure of percent cor-
rectly classified. The elements on the main
diagonal of Table 4 are the numbers and percen-
tages of cases correctly classified for each of the
four groups.
In the present context we shall focus only on the
total number of cases correctly classified rather
than on the individual groups. Because of missing
values for 30 of our 466 decisions, 436 cases were
available for classification. Of these 242 or 55.5
percent were correctly classified according to the
single mode of decision making that was em-
ployed. The question now concerns the establish-
ment of a suitable baseline or chance model
against which to compare this result in order to
determine how well our model fared. In other
words, what rate of successful classification might
we expect if we had no theoretical model, and
how does our model then perform in terms of pre-
dictive capability?
The baseline that we have chosen is derived
from LaPlace's Rule of Insufficient Reason,
whereby one simply guesses each category the
same number of times as every other category.
Our primary reason for selecting this baseline is
the fact that it incorporates no prior knowledge of
the marginal distribution of the dependent varia-
ble, as do other possible baselines.5 Since prior
probabilities were set equal (i.e., .25) in the dis-
criminant analysis, these predictions were not
'For example, we might guess each category only as
often as its observed frequency, leading to a baseline
figure of 28.4 percent [(.124) (.124) + (.206) (.206) +
(.305) (.305) + (.365) (.365)1. Alternatively, we could
simply guess the modal category (decision by interpreta-
tion) each time and achieve a 36.5 percent successful
classification rate. The use of such information con-
cerning the marginal distribution of the dependent
variable seems inappropriate for evaluating predictions
made a priori, as suggested by Hildebrand et al. (1976).
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based on prior knowledge of the actual distribu-
tion of the decision modes. Similarly, the predic-
tions in our simulation are a priori and not based
on the marginal distribution of the four decision
modes. Consequently, the expected proportion of
correct predictions that we employ as our baseline
is 25 percent.'
Having selected an appropriate baseline figure,
we must now devise some means of evaluating our
model's performance as compared to the chance
model. Such a procedure can be derived from the
general model for defining a proportionate reduc-
tion in error measure (PRE) (Hildebrand et al.,
1976, 1977). By modifying the PRE measures
slightly, we calculate the difference between the
actual percentage of correct predictions obtained
from the analysis and the number of correct pre-
dictions that one would expect from chance alone,
and then divide this difference by the number of
correct predictions expected from chance.7 This
calculation then provides us with a measure of the
proportional increase in accuracy attributable to
our model.
Taking the 55.5 percent successful classification
rate, and employing 25 percent as the appropriate
baseline, our proportional increase in accuracy
measure is calculated:
5 5 . 5 - 2 5 30.5
25 25
= 1.22.
+ (.25) (.305) + (.25)•(.25) (.124) + (.25) (.206)
(.365) = .25 or 25 percent.
'A similar and perhaps more familiar measure is
based on Goodman's and Kruskal's Lambda and is dis-
cussed in Weisberg (1978, p. 562). See also Hildebrand
et al. (1976, pp. 519-21).
According to this measure, we are able to improve
our classification by 122 percent over what we
would expect from chance alone.' This increase
represents a substantial improvement in our abil-
ity to classify the original observations according
to the mode of decision making actually em-
ployed.
A closer examination of the important variables
in the three discriminant functions reveals that
group structure is a key determinant of the differ-
ence among decision modes; in all three functions
variables reflecting characteristics of group struc-
ture are the most numerous. But the substance
and context of the conflict, as well as the decision
process, also contribute to the variation in likeli-
hood of the decision modes. This conforms to our
general model of decision making discussed ear-
lier: group structure is the first variable that enters
our flow process, and hence may be considered
the most important simply because it sets the stage
for the actual decision making that follows; this
structure is then mediated by the type of issue be-
ing considered, the context within which the con-
flict takes place, and the ensuing decision process.
Although discriminant analysis cannot deal ade-
'In addition to classifying the entire data set we also
performed a split half-sample analysis. This standard
cross-validation procedure, conducted for both the
pooled and unpooled versions of the discriminant analy-
sis, indicated that the overall classification results are
perhaps somewhat overstated as a consequence of being
maximized to this specific data set. However, since the
pooled version results varied only between 42 percent
and 63 percent, our estimate of 55.5 percent seems to be
quite reasonable. For a discussion of this cross-valida-
tion procedure see Dorff (1978, pp. 139-41).
Table 4. Classification Results
Actual Outcome
Majority Decision
Amicable Agreement
No Decision
Decision by Interpretation
Total
No. of
Cases
43
93
134
166
Majority
Decision
30
69.8%
12
12.9%
16
11.9%
22
13.3%
Correctly Classified =
Predicted Outcome
Amicable
Agreement
4
9.3%
47
50.5%
17
12.7%
28
16.9%
55.5%
No
Decision
4
9.3%
16
17.2%
76
56.7%
27
16.3%
Decision by
Interpretation
5
11.6%
18
19.4%
25
18.7%
89
53.6%
Source: Developed by the authors from data in Robert H. Dorff, "Employing Simulation Analysis in
Decision-Making Theory," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1978.
Note: The italicized percentages on the main diagonal represent the percent of cases correctly classified into each
of the four categories.
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quately with the flow of this process, it does ap-
pear to highlight the relative temporal importance
of each set of variables. In the next step we shall
try to incorporate this flow process more sys-
tematically in our analysis through the use of
simulation.
Simulation Analysis. In addition to discriminant
analysis, we also constructed a simulation for ana-
lyzing our data. The purpose of this simulation
was to create, a priori, a classification procedure
that would predict the decision mode on the basis
of a reduced set of independent variables drawn
from our original pool of variables. The primary
strength of simulation analysis lies in its ability to
handle the"flow process" nature of our model. In
other words, the dynamic branching effects that
we believe most accurately characterize this type
of decision-making process will be replicated
within the context of our simulation. Once again,
we can evaluate the model's performance on the
basis of the total number of cases correctly clas-
sified. We remind the reader of our earlier dis-
cussion of the single-point nature of these predic-
tions and the implications for assessing the over-
all accuracy of the predictive model.
On the basis of the discriminant analysis and
general correspondence with our original theoreti-
cal propositions we selected seven independent
variables for our simulation.' The variables and
the sets from which they are drawn are as follows:
I. Group Structure
1. Size of the Group
2. Political Status of the Group Members
II. Substance of the Conflict
3. Position versus Valence Issues
4. Reference Group of the Conflict
HI. Context of the Conflict
5. Time before Parliamentary Elections
6. Likelihood of a Referendum on the
Issue
IV. Decision Process
7. Origin and Number of the Proposals
For the sake of clarity we have briefly stated our
hypotheses in Table 5.
'Once again the basis for reducing the number of in-
dependent variables consists of a combination of the re-
sults of empirical tests (bivariate and discriminant
analyses) and the degree to which the suggested relation-
ship corresponded logically to our original hypotheses.
If, for example, a variable displayed some discriminat-
ing power but the direction was difficult to justify in
terms of our theoretical framework, we chose to exclude
that variable from the simulation. The selection of these
The first variable that enters the process is
group structure. From the moment a decision
group convenes, it takes on relatively fixed struc-
tural characteristics. In particular, each group will
be either small, medium, or large and will consist
solely or predominantly of high-status or low-
status actors. From our theory and the individual
hypotheses contained in Table 5 (Hypotheses 1
and 2), we would expect that group structure
alone would not suffice for the prediction of a
single decision mode. Our theory presumes that
certain tendencies should be evident under speci-
fic structural conditions but that an actual out-
come will remain largely indeterminate until fur-
ther information becomes available. In other
words, while certain structural combinations will
clearly favor one or two decision modes over the
others, group structure alone should rarely (if
ever) be sufficient for determining a single deci-
sion mode. Therefore, our simulation would
make note of the specific characteristics of the
group structure but would pass directly on to the
next variable (substance) rather than taking the
path to the predictions.
Once the meeting is convened, the group is con-
fronted by an agenda of issues. In each decision-
making situation, then, the actual substance of
the conflict begins to interact with the character-
istics of the group structure. In our model we dis-
tinguish between conflicts dealing with actual
goals (position) and conflicts dealing with means
(valence). Further, we consider the group to
which a conflict refers an important determinant
of the way in which the decision-making process
unfolds and, ultimately, of the decision mode ac-
tually employed. However, we also expect that the
criterion of position-valence will be somewhat
more important than the reference group, al-
though the interaction between the two remains
crucial. Our assumption follows from the argu-
ment that the position-valence nature of a conflict
will be the primary characteristic of the substance;
political decision makers will consider this factor
first, and only secondarily will they consider the
reference group to which a particular issue refers.
In general, we also assume that the combined
information regarding structure and substance
will not suffice for specific predictions. Our rea-
soning here is that the group structure and sub-
stance of a conflict, while of primary importance
in determining the resulting decision mode, will
not always lead in the same direction; hence some
indeterminacy must remain. Moreover, most
combinations of these two sets of variables will
variables is discussed in detail in Dorff (1978, pp.
285-95).
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serve only to narrow the range of possible decision
modes (for example, from four to three to two)
rather than to restrict that range to a single mode
which we could then predict. The exception to this
indeterminacy occurs for small groups comprised
solely of high-status actors or solely of low-status
actors.
The context of the conflict is the third factor to
affect the flow of the decision-making process.
The two variables that we employ are the time in-
terval to the parliamentary elections and the like-
lihood of a referendum. One might argue that the
time before the elections should enter the process
earlier than we have stated; however, the logic of
our theory indicates that concern with elections
will become salient only if the particular issue be-
ing considered is somehow relevant to the up-
coming elections. Concerns with electoral impact
should normally become salient only after the
substance of a conflict is apparent and the pre-
liminary discussion has taken place.
The final variable concerns the decision pro-
cess. Once a meeting is convened, an issue de-
termined, and the impact of contextual variables
ascertained, the actual way in which the discus-
sion proceeds will help determine which values
will change and which will remain fixed. As we
have pointed out earlier, we do not assume that
the values for every actor will remain invariant; in
Flow Chart of Decision-Making Process
Group Structure
Size
Status
I
Substance of Conflict
Position-Valence
Reference Group
-*
If sufficient
information:
PREDICTION
1
Context of Conflict
Distance to Elections
Likelihood of Referendum
-*
If sufficient
information:
PREDICTION
4
Structure of Discussion
Origin of Proposals
- * • PREDICTION
Table 5. Hypotheses for Independent Variables in Simulation
. the more the probability o f . . .
Independent Variables
majority
decision
decreases
decreases
increases
is unaffected
increases
increases
decreases
amicable
agreement
increases
increases
decreases
increases
increases
is unaffected
increases
no decision
is unaffected
is unaffected
increases
decreases
decreases
decreases
is unaffected
decision by
interpretation
is unaffected
is unaffected
decreases
increases
decreases
decreases
increases
1. The smaller the size of the decision
group. . .
2. The larger the portion of high-status
actors in a decision group . . .
3. The more a conflict deals not only
with means but also with ends ...
4. The more a conflict refers to matters
of the decision group itself. . .
5. The closer the time distance to the
next parliamentary election ...
6. The greater the likelihood of a
referendum about the issue under
consideration...
7. The more the high-status actors in
the group participate in the
articulation of proposals. . .
Source: Compiled by the authors.
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fact, we make the explicit assumption that these
values change from actor to actor and, for each
actor, from situation to situation. We anticipate
that the origin of the proposals (whether it ori-
ginates with a high- or low-status participant) will
be a major factor in effecting change in these
values and, hence, in the decision mode that is
employed.
Limitations of space simply do not allow us to
provide an extensive treatment of our simulation
model. Rather, we shall provide a very simple il-
lustration of the model's performance.
For our illustrative example we have chosen one
of the simplest cases because it can be described
briefly. In this case only three variables are needed
before we can make a prediction; the reason for
this relative paucity of information lies in the fact
that all three variables point to the occurrence of a
single decision mode. Therefore, the combined in-
teraction of the three variables should make this
single decision mode occur quite often.
The three characteristics associated with this
class of decisions are: a small group (seven or less)
comprised solely of high-status actors who are dis-
cussing a valence issue. A quick glance at Table 5
reveals that our hypotheses anticipate that all
three conditions strongly favor amicable agree-
ment, while both no decision and decision by in-
terpretation seem largely unaffected. All three
variables indicate that a majority decision is
highly unlikely under these conditions. Therefore,
we make the following predictions: amicable
agreement is the most likely outcome and is our
single-point prediction; no decision and decisions
by interpretation occupy an intermediate position
in which they are less likely to occur than amicable
agreement but not entirely unlikely; majority de-
cisions are predicted not to occur.
Our simulation, then, makes the preceding pre-
dictions and then compares them with the actual
outcomes of decisions made under this particular
set of circumstances. As it turns out, ten of the
observed decisions were made under these condi-
tions. Of these, six were made by amicable agree-
ment, two by no decision, and two by decision by
interpretation. For this set of decisions we have
therefore achieved a successful classification rate
of 60 percent. Again, however, we stress the fact
that this figure does not reflect the accuracy with
which we predicted the non-occurrence of major-
ity decisions nor the seemingly correct predictions
concerning the intermediate likelihoods of both
no decision and decision by interpretation. While
most of our predictions were considerably more
difficult to make than these, and of course some
were considerably less accurate, this example
should illustrate the nature of the prediction pro-
cess and how the results were obtained.
The entire classification process covered 436
cases. From our universe of 466 decisions we had
to omit 30 cases that had missing values on some
of the seven independent variables included in the
simulation. For 25 of the remaining 436 decisions
our prediction was indeterminate, leaving us with
411 cases for which we have actually made a
single-outcome prediction. In 237 cases (57.7 per-
cent) our predictions were correct. Employing our
previous standard of evaluation we find that this
figure represents a substantial improvement in our
ability to classify each decision according to the
actual mode of decision making that was em-
ployed. If we adopt a baseline of 25 percent,
which presumes that we have no a priori
knowledge of the distribution of the four modes,
our 57.7 percent correct classification rate consti-
tutes a 131 percent proportional increase in accu-
racy in our ability to predict the modes of decision
making.
Conclusion
The results of the analysis indicate that our
theoretical framework makes a significant con-
tribution to an understanding of these group de-
cision-making processes. The relative accuracy
and compatibility of the classification results
demonstrate that a substantial amount of the vari-
ation in the modes of decision making can be ex-
plained by the independent variables included in
our model. But what contribution does this study
make to a more general theory of decision making
in face-to-face groups?
First, an examination of our independent varia-
bles would show that almost all of them are of a
highly general nature. With the exception of the
referendum variable, all could be applied to com-
mittee decision-making processes in a wide variety
of national contexts, and the hypotheses we for-
mulated were not simply case-specific.
Second, our dependent variable is equally
broad in its range of potential applications. Dur-
ing the spring and summer of 1979, Robert Dorff
conducted a series of 12 decision-making experi-
ments employing graduate and undergraduate stu-
dents. The groups consisted of either five or ten
students. Preferences were induced monetarily
and participants received a modicum of instruc-
tions—they were told only that they had to choose
one of five decision outcomes on each of an in-
definite series of decisions. No instructions were
given concerning the decision mechanism. Yet in
these experimental groups we observed a signifi-
cant use of majority decision, amicable agree-
ment, and even decision by interpretation; no de-
cision was of course not allowed. Moreover, the
experimental control for group size also resulted
in clear support for our hypothesis: the larger
groups voted much more often on precisely the
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same items as small groups, which were much
more inclined to employ amicable agreement.
These experiments clearly indicate that a theoreti-
cal focus on the modes of decision making has a
broad applicability and could be useful in any
political context where decisions are made in face-
to-face groups. The precise refinement of our
theory to deal with this more general class of be-
havior is the goal of our current research efforts.
Third, the contribution of our theoretical
framework is not limited solely to its general ap-
plicability but includes the fact that it provides a
more tractable and meaningful way of studying
real-world committee decision-making behavior.
Because we were able to gather almost all of our
data through participant observation without
grossly disturbing the decision-making groups,
our methodology should open the door to more
frequent and in-depth analysis of such groups. In
this way, perhaps, some of the gap between the
study of experimental and real-world groups
might be narrowed.
In further work we have also examined some of
the consequences of the modes of decision mak-
ing. In particular, we have studied the effects of
the decision modes on (1) the willingness of politi-
cal actors to participate in meetings, (2) the level
of antagonism and hatred in the group, and (3)
the potential innovativeness of group decisions.
Finally, since so much political decision making
takes place in face-to-face groups, it is important
to see what kind of group decision-making be-
havior we consider more or less democratic. After
all, process as well as outcome is important to an
understanding of political decision making. A
focus on the modes of decision making should
allow us to deal with these issues as well.
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